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Speculation and Justification in Policy-Making on 
Neuroenhancement
Especulación y justificación en la elaboración de políticas sobre 
neuroenhancement
STEFAN SCHLAG 
JOHANNES GUTENBERG - UNIVERSIDAD DE MAINZ
Resumen
Los descubrimientos de las neurociencias permiten intervenir en el cerebro humano para 
mejorar su estado o sus capacidades sin indicación médica. Este fenómeno es conocido como 
“Neuroenhancement” y está sujeto a un amplio debate ético. Como “Neuroenhancement” es un 
fenómeno evolutivo, el debate de aspectos éticos está necesariamente orientado al futuro y depende 
de la información sobre el posible desarrollo de la tecnología y sus consecuencias para la sociedad. Sin 
embargo, hay que establecer límites para la formulación de previsiones especulativas en argumentos 
éticos y justificaciones políticas. Propongo distinguir argumentos con tres propósitos distintos: la 
formación de intuiciones éticas, el reflejo sobre el futuro de la sociedad y justificación de normativas 
y políticas. Para cada uno de ellos necesitamos estándares adecuados. Es tarea de la filosofía política 
desarrollar un estándar para los argumentos justificadores.
Palabras clave: ética anticipatoria, ética especulativa, formación de políticas, justificación, mejora 
de capacidades.
Abstract
Neuroscientific findings allow interventions in the human brain to improve its function or modify 
mental states even without medical indication. This procedure, termed as neuroenhancement, is subject 
to a broad ethical debate. As neuroenhancement is an evolving phenomenon, the debate is necessarily 
future-oriented and highly dependent on information about future developments. It remains an open 
question to what degree uncertain forecasting or even speculation should be considered in the ethical 
debate and policy-making. I propose to distinguish between arguments with three different purposes: 
intuition-forming, self-reflecting and justifying arguments. Adequate standards are required for all 
kinds of future-oriented arguments. The development of these standards for justifying arguments is a 
task for political philosophy.
Keywords: anticipatory ethics, justification, neuroenhancement, policy-making, speculative ethics.
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Introduction
Many technological developments are of great benefit for humanity. At the same 
time, they eventually pose serious threats. This ambivalence became apparent in the 
beginning of the atomic age. Could we have known what terrible effects nuclear 
fission brought about? Looking backwards, it seems to be an essential challenge for 
humanity to avoid catastrophes caused by technological developments. However, 
what the future will bring is a matter of speculation.
Neurosciences are said to be one of the most important technologies at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Equally important is the discipline of neuroethics 
which reflects on ethical, legal and social issues of neurosciences. Not surprisingly, 
neuroethics is highly dependent on speculation and a debate about the acceptability 
of speculation in ethical arguments developed. In this papers I would like to 
propose a different view on speculation that recognizes the various purposes of 
arguments in ethical debates.
In a first section, I will give a brief introduction to neuroenhancement, probably 
the most speculative application of the neurosciences. The second section provides 
a short overview on the ethical debate concerning neuroenhancement. As a crucial 
problem for the further development of the debate, the problem of uncertainty is 
identified. The third section, the discussion of three approaches to this problem will 
show that they fail to fully consider the specific purposes of speculative arguments. 
As a remedy, I will propose a distinction of three types of arguments that allow 
for different degrees of speculation. Concentrating on justifying arguments, I will 
conclude with some examples to illustrate the relation between speculation and 
justification, which is essential for policy-making.
Neuroenhancment1 on the Way
Neurosciences: Therapy and Enhancement
The human brain is in the focus of current research in many different scientific 
disciplines. They use a variety of approaches to gain a better understanding of the 
brain. Without doubt, Neuroscientists made ground-breaking discoveries.2 The 
exploration of the anatomical structure of the nervous system by Camillo Golgi 
and Santiago Ramón y Cajal in the 19th century was a first important step. They 
provided the basis of our contemporary understanding of the brain, namely that it 
is made up of a network of information-processing cells: the neuron theory. In the 
1  The concept is used here only for illustrating purposes. I associate no evaluative relevance (cp. Bostrom and 
Savulescu, 2009: 3). For the general problems of  the concept «Enhancement», see Savulescu et al., 2011.
2  For a brief  overview, see Chudler’s website http://faculty.washington.edu/chudler/hist.html#source.
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1960s, Eric Kandel conducted experiments with the sea slug Aplysia to explore the 
mechanisms at work on a cellular level. In the 1970s, imaging techniques as MRT, 
PET or CT were developed. They allow to examine the structure of the working 
brain and to identify the areas involved in processing sensory input, motor control 
and cognitive functions.
The progress of the complementary research on neuronal mechanisms and on 
the structure of the whole brain encourages some researchers to expect solutions 
for big mysteries of humanity, for instance the question of free will (Libet et al., 
1983) or the problem of consciousness (Crick and Koch, 2003). In contrast, others 
doubt that neuroscientific methods are appropriate to answer such philosophical 
questions. Nevertheless, the great potential of the neurosciences beyond these 
questions fundamental for human existence is undisputed. Insight into the central 
human organ and connected mental phenomena promises great benefit. Applications 
of neuroscientific knowledge have been successful, above all in medicine. The 
understanding of the brain as a whole including its anatomical structure, its cellular 
mechanisms and mental functions allows the diagnosis of diseases and is also the 
basis for attempts to actively intervene in the brain to influence its function. The 
aim is, if diseases cannot be cured, at least to alleviate symptoms. For example, 
antipsychotic drugs are used to treat depression, and deep brain stimulation reduces 
symptoms of Parkinson’s disease.
Beyond that, insight into functions of our brain and related mental phenomena 
attracts interest also in non-medical areas. A couple of scientific disciplines try 
to figure out how neuroscientific findings are connected to their fundamentals 
and what implications these findings could have for their own work (e.g. 
neuroeconomics, neurolaw). The findings are also used to make processes in 
everyday-life more successful. The setting of situations can be modified to make 
them more brain-friendly what facilitates or directs acting in these situations (e.g. 
neurodidactics, neuromarketing).
The systematic design of the environment of the brain is an interesting possibility, 
but attempts to intervene in the brain in order to improve mental states or processes 
in healthy individuals go much further. This non-medical use of neuroscientific 
findings is known as neuroenhancement and has brought about a distinct field 
of research.3 To clarify, neuroenhancement is not about the use of some external 
devices to improve performance (as e.g. magnifying glasses improve vision), but 
about direct interventions in physiological functions. Neuroenhancement is neither 
about interventions for medical purposes (as e.g. visual prosthesis restore vision), 
but about interventions to improve states or functions above the «normal» level of 
3  ??? ???? ????? ?? ? ?????????????????? ???? ?????????????? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ?? ? ???? ??????????? ?????????????
nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive sciences, which all contribute to possibilities 
of  human enhancement (Roco and Bainbridge, 2002). 
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healthy individuals. The idea of enhancement is known, for instance, from doping 
in sports to increase physical performance or from cosmetic surgery to change 
physical appearance with regards to aesthetics. The neurosciences allow for similar 
interventions in the nervous system, particularly in the human brain. This is not 
due to research specifically aiming at enhancement. Findings of basic research 
in neurosciences and their medical applications have given rise to general neuro-
techniques not limited to medical use but applicable for neuroenhancement as well.
Areas of Application and Methods
Possible areas of application of neuro-techniques for enhancement are four 
different kinds of mental states or capacities: emotional states, motivational states, 
moral capacities and cognitive capacities. Enhancing emotional states, the attempt 
to improve mental well-being, is adequately described by the idiomatic title of 
Elliott’s Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream. Motivational 
states determine our capacity of goal-directed behaviour. Moral capacities are 
such as moral judgement or social awareness. Among the cognitive capacities are 
alertness, attention, reaction time, memory, concentration or executive functions 
like planning, decision-making and behaviour control.4 
The currently discussed methods of enhancement are equally diverse: prenatal 
or postnatal genetic modifications, various technical implants (e.g. deep brain 
stimulation, brain-computer-interfaces) and psychotropic drugs are all said to 
possibly have enhancement effects. Most prominent are stimulants such as 
amphetamine (known as Adderall®, Dexedrine®, and as the recreational drug Speed), 
methylphenidate (known as ADHD-medication Ritalin® or Concerta®), modafinil 
(known as narcolepsy-treatment Vigil®) and caffeine; the antidepressant fluoxetine 
(known as Prozac®) and the antidementia agents donepezil or memantine.
Current Prevalence
The methods differ in the extent to which they are currently used for 
enhancement, respectively in the likelihood of their use in the future. In this regard, 
the psychotropic drugs mentioned above have a special status. Firstly, they are 
based on well-known technologies with a long history of application.5 Secondly, 
4  The boundaries between these four areas are blurred. For instance, moral capacities require cognitive capacities 
like judgement and include moral sentiments like shame (Metzinger and Hildt, 2011: 257).
5  Examples for early psychopharmacological enhancement are the distribution of  methamphetamine (Pervitin®) 
during the Second World War or the use of  Fenethylline (Captagon®) by students in the 1970s.
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these drugs have been approved for the treatment of diseases in many countries 
and are thus in principle available on the market. Thirdly, they are relatively cheap 
and easily applicable without the need for any technical devices, laboratories or 
surgery. As a consequence, pharmacological neuroenhancement is the only type of 
neuroenhancement pursued to a small but still observable degree. Newer studies with 
pupils and students in Germany report prevalence rates for the enhancement-use 
of psychotropic drugs between 1.5% and 5% (Franke et al., 2011: 62; Middendorff 
et al., 2012: 13). However, the number of potential users is much higher. 
Studies report that between 30% and 80% of the interviewed persons consider 
psychopharmacological enhancement as an option (Middendorff et al., 2012: 12; 
Franke et al., 2012: 51).6 The other methods mentioned above are used in medical 
contexts but are not yet ready for enhancement-use (e.g. deep brain stimulation). 
Still, other methods could prove their potential only in animal experiments or are 
mere theoretical considerations (e.g. radical genetic modifications of the human 
brain or the creation of completely new capacities).
To conclude with the merely technical background for the further discussion, I 
want to point out that the many forms of neuroenhancement are situated between 
societal reality and science fiction. As an evolving phenomenon, neuroenhancement 
is worth further analysis.
The Ethical Debate about Neuroenhancement
The State of the Debate in Neuroethics
Ethical, legal and social issues related to neuroenhancement together with 
ethical questions concerning other medical and non-medical applications of the 
neurosciences are discussed under the label of neuroethics.7 The initial phase of 
the debate about neuroenhancement was concerned with identifying general ethical 
problems and outlining possible arguments for and against neuroenhancement 
(Chatterjee, 2004; Farah et al., 2004; PCBE, 2003). Now, in a second phase, 
these arguments are subject to more in-depth analysis, criticism and completion 
with empirical data (Schöne-Seiffert, 2009: 349). Biedermann (2010) maps the 
argumentative landscape as follows:
A first kind of arguments deals with the ethical evaluation of enhancement 
as such. Some of them relate enhancement to God’s work or, in the secular 
version of the argument, to the natural. They either refuse enhancement as an 
illegitimate intervention into God’s work or into the natural respectively. Or they 
6  However, these studies should be interpreted with care. The results depend on study methods including speculative 
assumptions as will be criticised later.
7  A second branch of  neuroethics deals with the neuroscience of  ethics (Cortina, 2011: 39-47).
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endorse enhancement because they consider it as human vocation to continue 
God’s creation or as part of human nature to enhance oneself respectively. Other 
arguments about enhancement as such refer to social conventions and object that 
enhancement is cheating or contradicts the purpose of medicine.
A second kind of arguments refers to the consequences of neuroenhancement, 
either for the individual or for the society. Arguments on the individual level cite 
medical knowledge about possible side-effects, obvious and subtle. Additionally, 
they consider the philosophical question of what is a good and authentic life. On the 
societal level, the main issues are freedom (from direct or indirect coercion to use 
enhancement and freedom to use enhancement autonomously), aspects of justice, 
equality and fairness in competitive settings (enhancement as a threat to justice and 
enhancement as a remedy for injustices) (Biedermann, 2010, cp. e.g. Greely 2008; 
Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009; Metzinger and Hildt, 2011).
The discussion of these numerous and diverse arguments has by no means 
reached a consensus. The problems require much more ethical discussion and 
empirical work. Nevertheless, a third phase of the debate is emerging. Recent 
contributions critically reflect on the debate and suggest future directions of the 
debate. In the two following sections, I describe to two kinds of critique to sketch 
a problem for the debate about the evolving phenomenon of neuroenhancement.
The Next Step: From Ethics to Policies
The first critique of the enhancementdebate objects generalisations and calls 
for a careful differentiation and more detailed arguments aiming at specific 
policies.8 In their review of the debate, Bostrom and Savulescu (2009) recommend 
avoiding generalisations in judgements about enhancement. Instead, they suggest 
the individual and context-sensitive evaluation of different methods and areas of 
application. This has to include more precise questions about specific policyoptions 
(Bostrom and Savulescu, 2009: 19). Buchanan (2011) explains convincingly why this 
is necessary. He asserts that the debate has stalled because of the predominance 
of arguments aiming at general statements about enhancement. But «being for 
enhancement or against enhancement makes as little sense as being pro-globalization 
or anti-globalization» (Buchanan, 2011: 11). The more relevant task is identifying 
specific problems associated with the complex and unstoppable phenomenon of 
enhancement and finding practical responses to them (Buchanan, 2011: 11-12).9 
Even if it was possible to morally evaluate enhancement in general, it would remain 
unclear what the necessary reactions on the societal level are. Enhancement is not 
only a problem of individual ethics but also of policy-making and institutional 
8 With «policy», I refer to public and private policies on a local, national and global level.
9  Buchanan himself  suggests a new institution as a practical response to the problem of  international distributive 
?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
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design. Therefore, enhancement is a task for consumer protection policy, research 
policy, education policy, health policy and many more.
The second critique objects the empirical backing of many arguments for 
and against enhancement. Outram (2010) as well as Lucke et al. (2011) argues 
that prevalence rates and possible effects of current enhancement-methods are 
being overestimated. Concerning prevalence rates, although studies about non-
therapeutic use of pharmaceuticals exist, they do not investigate enhancement-use 
separately and are sometimes misinterpreted (Lucke et al., 2011: 39). With regard 
to effectiveness, results of the limited number of laboratory studies do not allow to 
draw reasonable conclusions for everyday situations (Outram, 2010: 199; Lucke et 
al., 2011: 40). Based on theoretical considerations about mechanisms responsible for 
addiction, Heinz et al. (2012) conclude that negative consequences of enhancement 
are being underestimated in the ethical debate. Without in-depth empirical research, 
the assumption of safe enhancement-methods remains rather speculative (Heinz et 
al., 2012: 374). In the light of the limited empirical evidence, Heinz et al. oppose 
arguments with an «if-then structure» which draw ethical conclusions on the basis 
of speculative assumptions about safe and effective enhancement-methods (Heinz 
et al., 2010: 372). That is exactly the argumentative pattern Nordmann (2007) 
identified in the enhancement-debate concerning possible future technologies. In 
this case, possible future developments are used to derive calls for attention, ethical 
conclusions and policy-recommendations. Although these scenarios are not results 
of scientific forecasting but improbable guesses about future developments, they 
are treated as if they were real. Nordmann criticises such arguments as «speculative 
ethics» (Nordmann, 2007: 31). Buchanan (2011) identifies a third kind of speculative 
assumptions. According to him, assumptions about user’s motives and social 
effects of enhancement are in many cases not supported by empirical evidence but 
generalising claims (Buchanan, 2011: 9). To sum up, this sort of critique identifies 
speculative assumptions about current technologies, future developments and 
their consequences in the enhancement debate. In contrast, the authors call for 
assumptions that are not merely speculative but supported by empirical evidence. 
Unfortunately, this empirical evidence is lacking.
The Problem of Limited Empirical Evidence in Policy-Making
Taken together, the two kinds of critique confront the debate about enhancement 
with a serious problem: How is policy-making based on limited empirical evidence 
possible?
As a preliminary, one might ask if this is really a problem. In the light of the 
mentioned arguments about empirical evidence, the need for policy-making may 
appear questionable. If enhancement is not a mass phenomenon and safe but 
effective means for enhancement do not exist, calls for action might be dispensable. 
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However, this consideration fails to fully acknowledge the complexity of the current 
development. Even though effects of enhancementmethods are limited and their 
use is not widespread, there is a considerably amount of research and development. 
Depending on the expected consequences of future developments, regulation of 
research and development needs to be addressed at an early stage. At the same time, 
a complete ban of specific research on enhancement is very difficult. Firstly, a ban 
to effectively stop enhancement research requires measures on a global level and is, 
therefore, highly unlikely (Bostrom, 2007: 139). Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the 
development of enhancementmethods is a by-product of useful basic and medical 
research (Schermer et al, 2009: 78). Therefore, enhancement, in whatever form, is 
very likely to progress. That requires societies to think about possible problems and 
appropriate practical responses in order to make the right decisions (Bostrom, 2007: 
131). This central aspect of the enhancement debate is reflected in the reasonable 
demand for anticipatory ethics and correspondent policies.
Obviously, anticipatory ethics is a complex and demanding enterprise. There 
are several reasons why it is hard to know what is the right thing to do. But how to 
proceed? Farah et al. (2004) pointed out early in the debate that sound conclusions 
require «disentangling moral principle and empirical fact» (Farah et al., 2004: 424). 
Accordingly, the problem of policy-making on uncertain grounds is twofold. 
On the one hand, the short introduction to the ethical debate above shows that 
intuitions about enhancement vary. The ethical problem is to reach a consensus 
about normative principles. On the other hand, concerning the empirical facts, we 
are faced with the epistemological «problem of uncertainty» (Brey, 2012: 2). That is, 
we do not know in advance what technological developments the future will bring 
and what consequences this will have. Anticipatory ethics, including policy-making, 
depends heavily on information about future developments and ethical judgements 
formed on the basis of this information. Several solutions for the problem of 
uncertainty have been proposed. Three of them, paradigmatic for three basic 
approaches, will be discussed in the next section.
Uncertainty in Anticipatory Ethics
Three Approaches to Uncertainty
A first approach to deal with uncertainty is accurate forecasting, represented 
here by Brey’s Anticipatory Technology Ethics (2012). Brey argues that the problem of 
uncertainty «can only be overcome through methodologically sound forecasting and 
future studies» (Brey, 2012: 1). Based on a critical analysis of three contemporary 
forecasting approaches, Brey establishes his own integrative approach. It is 
characterised by a distinction of three levels of analysis. The technology as such, 
artefacts as physical configurations of the technology and applications as particular 
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uses of artefacts are treated separately. For the technology and the artefact level, Brey 
suggests an ethical analysis of the inherent character and of possible consequences 
of the technology, the artefact respectively. In addition, the risk has to be evaluated 
that a technology results in morally problematic artefacts and that artefacts lead 
to morally problematic applications. On the application level, the analysis focuses 
on the morality of possible purposes of the artefact and on side effects of the use 
of the artefact (Brey, 2012: 8-9). So far, the approach provides a useful heuristic 
for the analysis and thus meets the requirement mentioned in the first kind of 
critique above: differentiation and contextualizing. Nevertheless, this is not yet a 
solution for the problem of uncertainty. To overcome the problem of uncertainty, 
Brey recommends a mixture of forecasting methods. Depending on the level of 
analysis, he suggests consultation of engineers, utilization of existing forecasting 
studies, initiation of expert surveys and roundtable discussion, consideration of 
policy documents, company studies, academic texts and even science fiction stories 
(Brey, 2012: 9-10). Brey demands scrutiny regarding feasibility and plausibility of 
future projections. Nevertheless, he concedes that forecasting is imaginative and 
speculative and, therefore, will never be exhaustive and sometimes may be wrong 
(Brey, 2012: 10). Due to this problem, the task of the ethical analysis is not only to 
identify possible negative impacts of future technologies but also to evaluate the 
likelihood that these impacts become important for society (Brey, 2012: 11). As a 
final step, Brey suggests three optional uses for the results of the analysis. Firstly, 
they can help to guide the development process of future technologies. Secondly, 
they can be used to assign responsibilities for possible negative impacts to actors in 
the development process. And thirdly, results of the ethical analysis can be used for 
policy-recommendations (Brey, 2012: 12). Again, Brey’s approach offers a useful 
overview on forecasting methods and possible uses of their results. Nevertheless, 
the author offers no solution to the problem of uncertainty. It remains an open 
question what «methodologically sound forecasting» (Brey, 2012: 1) really is and 
how exactly future projections can be evaluated. As a consequence, some writers 
are sceptical about the power of forecasting approaches (e.g. Bostrom, 2007: 150; 
Hanson, 2011: 138-139).
The two following approaches represent more general options. In his critique 
of speculative ethics, Nordmann (2007) opposes ethical engagement with human 
enhancement on uncertain grounds. Imagined possible technological developments 
and possible harmful consequences do not demand immediate attention (Nordmann, 
2007: 32). Instead, Nordmann maintains that scarce ethical resources should be 
allocated for examining on-going developments (Nordmann, 2007: 34). Refraining 
from speculation, Nordmann tries to avoid that present ethical issues become 
«displaced by a perceived need to proactively engage emerging issues” (Nordmann, 
2007: 34). His approach can be interpreted as being sceptical about the possibilities 
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of forecasting and the need for speculation concerning technological developments 
in human enhancement. Supporting Nordmann’s view, Schermer et al. (2009) 
identify ethical issues concerning psychopharmacological enhancement which are 
relevant today and require attention. One question is about off-label prescriptions 
for enhancement purposes by medical doctors (Schermer et al, 2009: 83). Another 
question concerns regulations of non-prescription use of enhancers (Schermer et 
al, 2009: 84). Without doubt, this contribution satisfies the demands of the first 
critique of the debate perfectly. Nevertheless, some of the ethical questions reveal a 
serious limitation of the approach. In addressing the issue of publically promoting 
enhancement research, the authors need to refer to possible future developments 
(Schermer et al., 2009: 80). Policy-making is not possible without considerations of 
future scenarios. To refrain from any forecast not only contradicts the intention of 
anticipatory ethics but is impossible. 
In opposition to Nordmann’s approach, Roache (2008) argues for an unrestricted 
debate about enhancement, open for speculation beyond current or emerging 
technologies. She recognises that «any decision about which course of action to 
take will involve attending to possible scenarios» (Roache 2008: 319). For several 
reasons, some of these scenarios have to be speculative. Firstly, the ethical evaluation 
of speculative scenarios is necessary to avoid the waste of scarce scientific resources. 
Roache gives the example of the development of morally problematic technologies. 
They can only be stopped by ethically motivated speculation and evaluation before 
the full emergence of their negative consequences (Roache, 2008: 323). Secondly, 
Roache points out that the evaluation of possible futures should not be limited to 
the probability of the scenario. An equally important aspect of the analysis is the 
possible harm that could be caused. If certain consequences of a technology are 
unlikely but extremely harmful, it is reasonable to avoid them (Roache, 2008: 323). 
In addition, speculative future scenarios can motivate technological developments 
to move in a desirable direction, for example the development of a cure for cancer 
(Roache, 2008: 323). In the enhancement context, one could argue that moral 
enhancement, though speculative today, is an equally desirable goal (Persson and 
Savulescu, 2012). However, should we really prepare for the imaginable worst case 
and, at the same time, invest in improbable but desirable projects? Roache admits 
that there are limits to speculation (Roache, 2008: 325). Her point is that being 
unlikely is not a sufficient reason to ignore possible future scenarios.
The discussion of the three approaches shows that anticipatory ethics bound 
strictly to scepticism about speculation is not satisfying. On the other hand, 
unlimited speculation in ethical analysis has its weaknesses. And even integrative 
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forecasting approaches do not solve the problem.10 The question remains to which 
extend speculation is acceptable in anticipatory ethics. I would like to propose 
a differentiated view on speculation. In my opinion, the general approaches of 
Nordmann and Roache fail to take into account the different uses of speculation in 
the neuroenhancement debate. Therefore, I will outline three types of arguments. 
Although they all have to make assumptions based on imagination, they serve 
different purposes. As a consequence, they require particular standards of 
knowledge and therefore speculation is acceptable to different degrees.
The Purpose of Speculative Arguments
The first type of arguments is mentioned by both, Nordmann and Roache. Such 
arguments «help us to examine our intuitions» (Roache, 2008: 318) or to «discover 
values that might guide decisions» (Nordmann, 2007: 43). Methodologically 
motivated, they use «improbable scenarios» (Nordmann, 2007: 42) not «ever likely 
to happen» (Roache, 2008: 318). This is what is known as thought experiments 
in philosophy.11 Nordmann and Roache point out that the question about these 
hypothetical scenarios is not how likely they are (Nordmann, 2007: 43; Roache, 2008: 
318). To be clear, according with Roache, I will call these scenarios hypothetical. They 
are theoretical assumptions often contradicting current technological possibilities. 
Disregarding empirical facts, hypothetical scenarios help to clarify normative 
principles. For the purpose of intuition-forming, there is no need to limit these 
thoughts.12 In the enhancement context, some surveys ask for the opinion about 
enhancers under the condition that they were safe and effective. A proper intention 
of such surveys is exploring people’s intuitions about enhancement. Theoretically 
excluding limited effects and unavoidable side-effects allows asking for the values 
people hold beyond realistic cost-benefit-analysis. Surveys of this type should not be 
used for extrapolations of future prevalence rates. Interpreted correctly, they should 
not be accused of making false assumptions.
The second type of arguments helps the society to reflect on technological 
developments and on itself. These arguments are about visions, positive and 
negative, how society might look like in the future. Imaginative but not predictive, 
they move on from current technologies to possible developments of technology 
and possible consequences of current and future technologies. Inevitably, they are 
10   Other  approaches  dealing  with  uncertainty  are   less  prominent  and   less  elaborated.  For   instance,  Bostrom  
mentions   the  possibility   to  «resort   to  courses  of  action   that  will  do  reasonably  well   independently  of   the  
details  of  how  things  turn  out»  (Bostrom  2007:  36).  Unfortunately,  he  gives  no  examples.
11   ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
12   Intuition-­forming  should  not  rely  exclusively  on  thought  experiments  because  they  can  serve  as  misleading  
????????????????????????????????????
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speculative in the sense that, however improbable the scenarios are, there is a chance 
that they become true. However, no claims about the likelihood of the scenarios are 
needed. Arguments of this type can have the positive effects mentioned by Roache. 
Being future-oriented, imaginative and speculative, they widen the horizon to either 
identify possibly harmful developments or motivate ethical projects. In this sense, 
even Nordmann seems to accept such arguments as long as they provide «a backdrop 
for society to reflect upon itself» (Nordmann, 2007: 43). In the enhancement debate, 
most arguments about new enhancement methods and possible consequences for 
society are of this type. It is important to note that they are not identical with the 
first kind of arguments. While the hypothetical scenarios are abstract theoretical 
constructs used to form intuitions or identify values, speculative scenarios are 
empirical claims about possible futures which need to be evaluated.
The third kind of arguments is not adequately considered in the approaches of 
Nordmann and Roache. The purpose of these arguments is the justification of poli-
cies. They possess two basic characteristics. First, policies discussed in an enhance-
ment context are aimed at solving problems somehow related to the development 
and use of enhancementmethods. To be effective and enforceable, they have to 
address the problems implementing specific measures. Relevant arguments, as the 
first critique mentioned earlier demands, need to be equally specific. Second, poli-
cies concerning enhancement will to some extent restrict individual freedom (e.g. 
of users, physicians, manufacturers, distributors, researchers, tax-payers). Therefore, 
arguments need to give sufficiently compelling reasons to justify the restrictions of 
freedom. The justifying power of arguments depends on the strength of normative 
assumptions and on the quality of empirical assumptions.13 The last point renders 
the status of speculative arguments for justification highly problematic. In the en-
hancement debate, arguments ending with policy-recommendations are possibly of 
this type and have to be subjected to scrutiny. However, not all closing statements 
of general character should be misinterpreted as serious specific conclusions. Ironi-
cally, one of the major problems of the debate is the lack of these specific, problem-
solving policyrecommendations.
By distinguishing purposes of arguments, I have to admit, the problem of uncer-
tainty is not solved. However, the distinction clarifies the need for different kinds 
of epistemological standards in the enhancement debate. The development of these 
standards for arguments of justification and the evaluation of arguments in the light of 
these standards is a challenge for political philosophy. Even though the acceptability 
of knowledge for justifications is ultimately a political decision, political philosophy 
can guide necessary deliberations. The debate about enhancement is not only a topic 
for ethics and technology assessment, political philosophy can contribute substantially.
13   This  point  has  not  been  elaborated  in  the  enhancement  debate.  Nevertheless,  some  authors  allude  to  this  basic  
???????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
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Speculation and Justification
To conclude, I would like to propose a couple of examples which might serve 
as a starting point for the development of a more comprehensive framework for 
the justification of policies concerning neuroenhancement. They are based on a 
speculative scenario: A society conducts neuroscientific research that might lead to the develop-
ment of a powerful and acceptably safe enhancing drug. One day, the drug might be widely used 
in the society. That possibly leads to several consequences for the society, which might be evaluated 
positively or negatively. For instance, only to allude to the most common arguments in the debate, 
non-users might feel pressured to use the drug against their will; the eventually high price of the 
drug might lead to an undesired stratification of the society; in contrast, a low price and specific 
patterns of action might help levelling the playing field in competitive situations.14 Of course, 
in the extensive literature about enhancement no similarly simplified scenario can 
be found. The abstraction is exaggerated for illustrating purposes only. While such 
scenarios are perfectly possible and might serve to motivate further thinking, it is 
questionable to what extent they can justify policies. Every single sentence includes 
speculation about future developments.
If the possible consequences are evaluated extremely negative, can this justify 
a ban of the research on the technology? Apart from the arguments against the 
feasibility of such a ban, a general research-banning policy does not directly aim 
to solve a problem caused by the consequences of possible technologies. Not 
being specific enough, the policy rules out all possible outcomes of the research in 
question, negative and positive. As long as the likelihood of positive and negative 
consequences cannot be compared on scientific grounds, mere speculation should 
not be decisive. On the other hand, a ban of research is an extensive restriction of 
freedom applying to all researches for sure. It has to be weighed against the many 
«mights» in the scenario. In contrast, a ban of an application of the technology 
(in Brey’s terminology) can be more specific. Suitable problem-oriented policies 
are limited to specific contexts. They limit freedom not in general but only in 
these contexts. Therefore, they seem to be easier to justify even if they are equally 
speculative.
What can be done if speculation does not allow for a justification of strict poli-
cies? One example among the unlimited policy-options is monitoring. Whereas 
speculations about positive or negative consequences cannot be compared sci-
entifically, it can be monitored whether they arise. Do people increasingly feel 
pressured to use enhancement drugs? Do usage patterns indicate significant 
differences between the rich and the poor? These questions can be examined 
with resources increasing as results confirm speculation. Monitoring, even if it 
14??????????????????????????????????
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is mandatory for drug manufacturers, schools or other organisations, is far not 
as restrictive as a ban. It is supposedly easier to justify although it is based on a 
highly speculative scenario. Thereby, monitoring fulfils exactly one of the func-
tions Roache ascribes to speculative ethics: the motivation of ethical projects. It 
cannot be settled here whether monitoring is a squandering of scarce resources in 
the sense of Nordmann.
An option aiming at positive consequences of enhancement is research funding. 
Can speculative benefits from future enhancement technologies justify the alloca-
tion of scarce research resources especially to enhancement projects? In the light of 
possible adverse effects of the very same enhancement methods to be developed, 
the problem is that funding supports all possible outcomes of the research, negative 
and positive. Again, speculative assumptions should not be decisive. Basic medical 
research is an alternative where expected benefits, however improbable they may 
seem, outweigh possible harmful consequences.
Conclusion
Basic neuroscientific research and medical applications are the source of general 
neuro-techniques. These are applicable for enhancement purposes as well. Neuro-
ethicists discuss a variety of ethical legal and social issues. Recent criticism of the 
debate shows the need for more concrete, policy-oriented discussion. At the same 
time, much information needed for policy-making is lacking. Policy-making on un-
certain grounds is a serious problem. This article reviewed three approaches trying 
to solve the problem of uncertainty: forecasting, abstinence and speculation. The 
discussion showed that none of the three general approaches satisfies the needs of 
anticipatory ethics concerning neuroenhancement. We need to know how neuro-
sciences and their applications for enhancement could change our society and how 
we want to react. Nevertheless, the central question remains unanswered: to what 
extend is speculation in anticipatory ethics and policy-making acceptable? As a first 
step to a solution, I proposed a differentiated view on speculation. Central for this 
perspective is a distinction between three different purposes of arguments in the 
enhancement debate: intuition-forming, self-reflection and justification. Specula-
tive scenarios are used differently in these arguments. It becomes clear, that it is 
not necessary to rule out speculative scenarios completely. Neither is it necessary 
to endorse all speculative scenarios. It is important to draw the right conclusions 
depending on the purpose of the argument.
With respect to the normative dimension, we need to form our moral intuitions. 
Unrestricted hypothetical scenarios in the sense of thought-experiments can help. 
In addition, we need to know about and prepare for possible harmful or benefiting 
25STEFAN SCHLAG y JOHANNES GUTENBERG  ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ???????????????
technologies and their consequences. Imaginative speculative scenarios help the 
society to reflect on possible developments in the future. Finally, we need to take 
specific measures to manage the development. But the argumentative justification 
of these freedom-restricting policies is demanding. That requires moral consensus 
and empirical information about the future. Consequently, a major challenge for the 
debate about neuroenhancement is the question how policies can be justified on the 
basis of speculative information about the future. Apparently, we need both, sound 
justification and speculation. It is a task for political philosophy in the debate about 
problems of enhancement to develop standards for the acceptability of speculative 
scenarios in justifying arguments. A comprehensive framework has to distinguish 
and to describe policy-options in order to explain what degree of speculation is 
acceptable for the justification of these options.
Literature
BIEDERMANN, F. (2010): «Argumente für und wider das Cognitive Enhancement», 
Ethik in der Medizin, 22 (4), pp. 317-329. [DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s00481-010-0070-3].
BOSTROM, N. (2007): «Technological Revolutions: Ethics and Policy in the Dark» in 
MITCHELL, M.E. and CAMERON, N. (ed.) Nanoscale. Issues and Perspectives for the Nano 
Century. Hoboken, N.J. John Wiley, pp. 129-152.
BOSTROM, N. and SANDBERG, A. (2009): «Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, 
Regulatory Challenges», Science and Engineering Ethics, 15 (3), pp. 311-341. [DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-009-9142-5].
BOSTROM, N. and SAVULESCU, J. (2010): «Human Enhancement Ethics: The State of 
the Debate» in SAVULESCU, J. (ed.): Human Enhancement. Oxford, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, pp. 1-22.
BREY, P.A. E. (2012): «Anticipatory Ethics for Emerging Technologies», Nanoethics, 
6 (1), pp. 1-13. [DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11569-012-0141-7].
BUCHANAN, A.E. (2011): Beyond Humanity? The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement.Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press.
CHATTERJEE, A (2004): «Cosmetic Neurology. The controversy over enhancing 
movement, mentation, and mood», Neurology, 63 (6), pp. 968-974. [DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1212/01.WNL.0000138438.88589.7].
CORTINA, A. (2011): Neuroética y Neuropolítica. Sugerencias para la Educación Moral. Ma-
drid, Tecnos.
CRICK, F. and KOCH, C. (2003): «A Framework for Consciousness», Nature neurosci-
ence, 6 (2), pp. 119-126.
26 RECERCA, 13. 2013. ISSN: 1130-6149 - DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.6035/Recerca.2013.13.2 - pp. 11-27
DENNETT, D. (1995): «Intuition Pumps» in BROCKMANN, J. (ed.): The Third Culture. 
New York, Simon & Schuster, pp. 181-197.
FARAH, M.J. et al. (2004): «Neurocognitive enhancement: what can we do and what 
should we do?», Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 5 (5), pp. 421-425. [DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn1390].
FRANKE, A.G. et al. (2012): «Attitudes Toward Cognitive Enhancement in Users 
and Nonusers of Stimulants for Cognitive Enhancement: A Pilot Study», AJOB 
Primary Research, 3 (1), pp. 48-57. [DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507716.2
011.608411].
FRANKE, A.G. et al. (2011): «Non-Medical Use of Prescription Stimulants and Il-
licit Use of Stimulants for Cognitive Enhancement in Pupils and Students 
in Germany», Pharmacopsychiatry, 44 (2), pp. 60-66. [DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1055/s-0030-1268417].
GREELY, H. et al. (2008): «Towards responsible use of cognitive-enhancing 
drugs by the healthy», Nature, 456 (7223), pp. 702-705. [DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1038/456702a].
HANSSON, S.O. (2011): «Coping with the Unpredictable Effects of Future Tech-
nologies», Philosophy & Technology, 24 (2), pp. 137-149. [DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s13347-011-0014-y].
HEINZ, A. et al. (2012): «Cognitive neuroenhancement: false assumptions in the ethi-
cal debate», Journal of Medical Ethics, 38 (6), pp. 372-375.
LIBET, B. et al. (1983): «Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of 
cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely vol-
untary act», Brain, 106 (3), pp. 623-642.
LUCKE, J. et al. (2011): «Deflating the Neuroenhancement Bubble», AJOB Neurosci-
ence, 2 (4), pp. 38-43. [DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2011.611122].
METZINGER, T. and HILDT, E. (2011): «Cognitive Enhancement» in ILLES, J. and 
SAHAKIAN, B. (ed.): Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, pp. 245-264.
MIDDENDORFF, E. et al. (2012): Formen der Stresskompensation und Leistungssteigerung bei 
Studierenden. HISBUS-Befragung zur Verbreitung und zu Mustern von Hirndoping und 
Medikamentenmissbrauch. HIS: Forum Hochschule, 01/2012.
NORDMANN, A. (2007): «If and Then: A Critique of Speculative NanoEthics», Na-
noethics, 1 (1), pp. 31-46. [DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11569-007-0007-6].
OUTRAM, S. (2010): «The use of methylphenidate among students: the future of en-
hancement?», Journal of Medical Ethics, 36 (4), pp. 198-202. [DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1136/jme.2009.034421].
PERSSON, I. and SAVULESCU, J. (2012): Unfit for the future. The Need for Moral Enhance-
ment. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
27STEFAN SCHLAG y JOHANNES GUTENBERG  ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ???????????????
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2003): Beyond Therapy. Biotechnology and the Pursuit 
of Happiness. Washington, D.C.
ROACHE, R. (2008): «Ethics, Speculation, and Values», Nanoethics, 2, pp. 317-327. 
[DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11569-008-0050-y].
ROCO, M.C. and BAINBRIDGE, W. S. (2002): Converging Technologies for Improving Human 
Performance. Arlington, Virginia.
SAVULESCU, J. et al (2011): «Well-Being and Enhancement» in SAVULESCU, J. et al. 
(ed.): Enhancing Human Capacities. Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell.
SCHERMER, M. et al. (2009): «The Future of Psychopharmacological Enhancements: 
Expectations and Policies», Neuroethics, 2, pp. 75-87. [DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s12152-009-9032-1].
SCHÖNE-SEIFERT, B. (2009): «Neuro-Enhancement: Zündstoff für tiefgehende Kon-
troversen» in SCHÖNE-SEIFERT, B. (ed.): Neuro-Enhancement. Ethik vor neuen Heraus-
forderungen. Paderborn, mentis-Verlag, pp. 347-363.
Artículo recibido: 25/10/2012
Solicitud de revisión: 07/12/2012
Artículo aceptado: 09/04/2013
